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How Do Judges Decide? A Course for Non-
Lawyers
Edmund B. Spaeth. Jr.*
I. Introduction
Usually, when we have a job to be done, we define the
responsibilities of that job and then look for someone qualified to fulfill
those responsibilities. That is not how we pick our judges-at least not
in Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, political parties pick their judicial
candidates based upon their ability to be elected, not necessarily because
they are qualified; those who vote know almost nothing about the
candidates; and the process of getting elected undermines, if it does not
destroy, the winner's credibility. The result? The public does not
respect the courts.
The question, in short, is no longer whether to change the way we
* Chairman emeritus, Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts. Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr.,
served on the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, and from 1973 to 1986, on the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, of which he became President Judge. He has taught
Evidence and Professional Responsibility at the University of Pennsylvania Law School,
and, until June 2002, was counsel to Pepper Hamilton LLP. He was longtime Chair of
the Board and currently serves as chairman emeritus of Pennsylvanians for Modem
Courts. He wishes to thank Kristy Swanger and her colleagues on the Dickinson Law
Review for their help in editing this paper.
1. I do not propose, in this paper, to justify this assertion in any detail but leave that
to others. Suffice it to say that two recent nationwide surveys found that "76 percent of
voters now believe that donors to judges' campaigns get special treatment in court-and
even 26 percent of judges agree." Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, State Judges
and Voters Sound Alarm: Money and Special Interests Increasingly Threaten Fair and
Impartial Courts (February 14, 2002), at http://www.JusticeatStake.org. In Pennsylvania,
88 percent of the respondents to a 1998 poll stated their belief that judges' rulings are at
least sometimes influenced by large contributions to their election campaigns.
PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN COURTS, BLUEPRINT FOR T{E FUTURE OF JUDICIAL
SELECTION REFORM 2 (1999), available at http://pmconline.org/blue/text.htm. "A 1999
survey conducted by the Texas Office of Court Administration and the State Bar of Texas
found that 83 percent of the respondents believed that campaign contributions have a
'very significant' or 'somewhat significant' influence on judges' decisions." Brief of the
Amici Curiae Public Citizen at 9, Republican Party v. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No.
01-521) (citing JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN FIN. STUDY COMM., SUPREME COURT OF TEX.,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (1999)).
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pick our judges, but how to change it. Any change will entail amending
the Pennsylvania Constitution and that will require voter approval.
Therefore, the first and principal part of this paper will outline a course
designed to explain to non-lawyers, the persons to whom it matters the
most, the nature of judges' responsibilities-not all of their
responsibilities but the central one: to decide cases according to the law.
My hope is that such a course will improve the chance that when we do
make a change, it will be a good one. For the greater the number of
persons who understand how judges do, or should, decide cases, the
greater the chance of a sound amendment changing the way we pick our
judges.
The second part of this paper is a plea for help. As outlined, the
course materials include literature and films. These selections are highly
personal and are offered tentatively and provocatively. My plea is that
others, perhaps led by a law school or the organized bar, will strengthen
and complete the course and teach it, or teach others to teach it.
Finally, the third part of this paper explains why I believe that
understanding the nature of a judge's responsibilities leads irresistibly to
the conclusion that judges should not be elected but should be appointed
after a nonpartisan (or bipartisan) determination of their qualifications.
Among those who agree that judges should be appointed, there are
differences of opinion regarding the composition of the body responsible
for determining qualifications. I do not attempt to resolve these
differences in this paper. That is for another day, and for others more
astute than I to the political compromises that will be necessary.
II. The Course: How Do Judges Decide?
Judges are technicians; judging is a craft. Learned Hand, quoting
Oliver Wendell Holmes, described it as a "job."2 But it is more than just
a job. Different judges will sometimes perform the same job differently:
using the same legal tools, one will vote to affirm, the other to reverse.
This may reflect a difference in skill. But judges of equal skill may also
differ, for they may bring different experiences and perspectives to the
job at hand. Therefore, when we are considering whether a particular
2. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. FOR PROF'L COMPETENCE, THE REPORT ON THE ARDEN
HOUSE CONFERENCE 116-23 (1958), reprinted in RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 185 (1976).
When we [Holmes and Hand] got down to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke a
response, so as he walked off, I said to him, "Well, Sir, goodbye. Do justice!"
He turned quite sharply, and he said: "Come here. Come here." I answered:
"Oh, I know, I know." He replied: "That is not my job. My job is to play the
game according to the rules." I have never forgotten that.
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person should be a judge, we should consider much more than whether
that person is a competent technician. We should also ask, "Is this the
sort of person I want to decide matters of great importance and
difficulty?"
In the course outlined in this paper, the participants would be asked
to act as judges in difficult situations. The hope is that by doing so, they
would encounter, and therefore sense, the demands that being a judge
makes, not so much on one's technical skill as on one's personal
resources. I believe that if the participants do sense these demands, they
will be better judges of who their judges should be and, therefore, of how
to select them.
The following outline is in the form of a Discussion Leader's Guide.
The Discussion Leader might be a law professor or lawyer, but probably
should not be a judge, who would likely inhibit robust criticism of judges
and the judicial system. The Discussion Leader might also be a teacher
in a field related to the law, such as history, government, or philosophy.
The imagined participants include voters, high school students,
college students, and any persons aspiring to citizenship. The suggested
course materials have been chosen accordingly. The central materials
are excerpts from literature or films easily accessible and mostly well
known.3  Nevertheless, any serious discussion of a judge's
responsibilities requires the participants' understanding of some basic
legal principles, for example, that our government is a government of
limited and separated powers. For that reason, some instruction using
legal materials is provided. No effort is made, however, to provide a
baby law school course, which could only be second rate, or worse.
A suggested syllabus is attached in Appendix A. Most teachers, I
expect, have found that, after an hour and a half, no one is listening to
them. The syllabus accordingly suggests nine sessions, each an hour or a
little more. The number of participants should be small enough to
involve everyone in the discussion.
A. The First Session: The Rule of Law
When we discuss a judge's responsibilities, we discuss the
fundamental premise of our system of government: The Rule of Law. It
3. Some copyright and logistical problems may be noted. The outline draws
heavily from a course on judicial ethics developed in 1997 at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, with copyright privileges later being assigned by the
University to the American Bar Association. Ideally, participants in the course should
read the literature in advance, but that would not be essential-the Discussion Leader
could summarize it. Neither would it be essential to show the film excerpts, although
they are brief and vivid and wonderful stimulants of discussion. Use of the literature and
film excerpts would require further consideration of copyright issues.
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is quite true that our history includes lawless violence, such as "frontier
justice" and lynching, but we recognize that such conduct is lawless.
Our faith, or conviction, was early stated by Chief Justice Marshall:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford
that protection.... The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve that high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
4
In quoting this passage, I do not suggest that the Discussion Leader
begin by stating the facts and holding of Marbury v. Madison. That can
come later. But quotation would not be a bad way to begin, for this
passage is canonical. Everyone, at least everyone concerned about our
legal system, should know it.
The often-quoted Alexis de Tocqueville observed that respect for
the rule of law has "penetrate[d]" our society; it is among "the habits and
tastes" of "the whole people.",5 Nevertheless, the idea of the "rule of
law" or of "a government of laws, not men," is not a simple idea. Any
careful examination requires one to ask what exactly do we mean by
"law"? 6 This question is considered later, starting with the next session.
At this point, as an introduction, discussion may be more general.
The Discussion Leader might use all sorts of materials to illustrate
the strength of the principle of the rule of law in our society. The
materials might include the work of the American Bar Association with
Eastern European countries seeking to reform their legal systems. Such
materials would demonstrate the value that societies may place on the
rule of law when they do not have it. Or the Discussion Leader might
seek the help of the participants. A participant who has lost a friend in a
drive-by shooting could comment on whether it was an exaggeration for
the Chief Justice to say that the rule of law is the "very essence of civil
liberty."7  But whatever materials the Discussion Leader selects to
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
5. RONALD A. CAss, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 23 (2001) (quoting de
Tocqueville's observations and providing a balanced and comprehensive discussion).
My discussion here and throughout is indebted to Dean Cass's book. It might well be
assigned reading in a course for undergraduates.
6. Id. at 4-19 (defining the elements of the rule of law). In Dean Cass's view, "the
rule of law" does not require, or imply, that the "law" conform to morality. Thus he
would not "pull the meaning of the rule of law away" to exclude immoral laws such as
laws on slavery. Id. at 17. Among the other merits of his book is its fair-minded
recognition of a contrary opinion, accompanied by notes amounting to an excellent
bibliography.
7. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163.
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illustrate the strength of the rule of law, the point to be driven home is
that, in our society, the rule of law is taken very seriously; no one is
above the law.
The attached syllabus suggests that the strength of the rule of law be
demonstrated by two cases. In United States v. Nixon,8 the Court
rejected President Nixon's claim of executive privilege and ordered him
to respond to the special prosecutor's subpoena for tape recordings. In
Clinton v. Jones,9 the Court held that President Clinton was not immune
from suit by Paula Corbin Jones for alleged improper sexual advances
while he was governor of Arkansas and ordered that he submit to being
deposed. President Clinton might have believed that he could evade
damage, but President Nixon could not have thought so. Can one
imagine Stalin, or Pinochet, or Trujillo, or any other tyrant, acceding to
the Court's order?
In concluding the first session, the Discussion Leader might
introduce the participants to the formal rules that state a judge's
responsibility to respect and comply with the law by giving them a copy
of the Code of Judicial Conduct of the jurisdiction in which the course is
being presented. By examining the Code, the participants could identify
the three defining characteristics judges must have if we are to enjoy the
rule of law: competence in the law;' 0 impartiality;" and independence.
12
The ensuing sessions are designed to explore each of these characteristics
in turn. The next session focuses on judicial competence, more
specifically, on how judges construe a statute.
B. The Second Session: Competence: Statutory Construction
In preparation for this session, the participants should read Herman
Melville's novella, Billy Budd,13 or the Discussion Leader may open the
session by playing the court-martial scene from the movie based on Billy
Budd.14 But neither pre-class reading nor in-class videotape is essential.
Instead, the Discussion Leader may simply open discussion by telling the
story of Billy Budd, as I do briefly below, to define the issue presented.
The facts are undisputed. Budd, a sailor on a British man-of-war
under the command of Captain Vere, struck and killed John Claggart, the
master-at-arms. Budd struck Claggart because Claggart had falsely
8. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
9. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
10. PENNSYLVANIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A (2002).
11. PENNSYLVANIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2002).
12. PENNSYLVANIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2002).
13. HERMAN MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD (Frederic Barron Freeman ed., Washington
Square Press 1972) (1924).
14. But see supra note 3.
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accused him of plotting a mutiny. Budd, furious and frustrated in how to
reply because of a speech defect, hit Claggart, but did not mean to kill
him. When Captain Vere saw that the members of the court martial were
about to acquit Budd, he intervened and persuaded them to sentence
Budd to death.
Captain Vere agreed with the members of the court that on general
moral principles, Budd was innocent and should not be condemned to
death. 15 He argued, however, that under the Mutiny Act, Budd was
guilty. The Act made it a capital offense to strike a superior; there was
no requirement that the striking be with the intent to kill. This, Captain
Vere told the members of the court, was "the law." "For the law and the
rigor of it, we are not responsible ... [H]owever pitilessly that law may
operate, we nevertheless adhere to it and administer it."
16
Captain Vere supported his argument by reference to the context in
which the case arose. Great Britain and France were at war and recently
there had been a serious mutiny in the British Navy. If Budd was not
executed, as in Vere's view the Mutiny Act required: "Your clement
sentence," Vere told the members of the court, "they [the other members
of the crew] would account pusillanimous. They would think that we
flinch, that we are afraid of them--afraid of practicing a lawful rigor
demanded at this juncture .. .
Having thus stated the case, the Discussion Leader should ask the
participants to imagine themselves as members of the court martial
convened to try Billy Budd. "How would you have decided? Would
Captain Vere's arguments have convinced you to condemn Budd to
death? If not, why not?" In asking these questions, the Discussion
Leader should point out that Vere's arguments present at least two
distinct issues: one, was he right in his interpretation of the Mutiny Act,
and, two, if he was right, was the Act so "pitiless," so contrary to moral
principle, that the court should have refused to enforce it (as one member
of the court sought to do by attempting to withdraw)?
Without a doubt, Captain Vere's argument is powerful. On one
occasion, when I presented Billy Budd to a group of Georgia trial and
appellate judges, a substantial majority agreed with Vere. But that is the
point. Some of the Georgia judges thought that it may be argued still
more powerfully that Billy Budd should not have been condemned to
death but acquitted. The argument might go something like this:
All civilized penal systems make liability to punishment for at any
rate serious crime dependent not merely on the fact that the person to
15. MELVILLE, supra note 13.
16. Id. at 73.
17. Id. at 75.
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be punished has done the outward act of a crime [striking Claggart],
but on his having done it in a certain state or frame of mind or will.1
s
The authors of the Mutiny Act, as civilized representatives of a
civilized king, it might be argued, must have known this general
principle. Therefore, when they wrote that it was a capital offense to
strike a superior, they must have assumed that the reader would
understand that they meant, to strike with the intent to kill or do
substantial harm, without their having to say so explicitly. At the very
least, if they meant that it was a capital offense to strike a superior even
without such an intent, they should have said so. As for Captain Vere's
deterrence argument: it proves too much. The threat of execution may
deter someone from acting with bad intent; it cannot deter someone who
acts in understandable anger maliciously provoked.
Some of the Georgia judges took a middle ground. While inclined
to agree with Captain Vere, they sought reassurance and said that they
would order execution but defer it until the sentence had been reviewed
by higher authority with the power to grant clemency.
After the participants have debated Billy Budd's fate, the
Discussion Leader should point out that a judge's interpretation of a
statute is not unconstrained but is guided by long-settled rules of
construction. Some of these rules are illustrated by the three cases for
the third session cited in the syllabus. 19 The participants should be
20prepared to discuss these cases at the next session.
C. The Third Session: Competence: Law and Morality
In 1910, Congress passed the Mann Act, which said it should be
"known and referred to as the 'White-Slave Traffic Act."' 21 The Act
made it a crime to transport
any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or
for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to
induce, entice or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute
or give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral
18. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1969), reprinted in part in
JOHN ARTHUR & WILLIAM H. SHAW, READINGS IN TE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 287 (3d ed.
2001). This collection of readings is for non-lawyers, and like CASS, supra note 6, might
be assigned reading.
19. See infra app. A.
20. To show how old the rules of statutory construction are, and how little the
statement of them has changed, the participants might also be given a copy of the excerpt
from Blackstone reprinted in ARTHUR & SHAw, supra note 18, at 90-91.
21. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, § 1, § 2, § 5, § 8, 36 Stat. 825, 825-27




In Caminetti v. United States,23 the United States Supreme Court
held that two men violated the Act when they took their mistresses across
a state line. Under the "plain" meaning of the Act, the Court said that the
men had transported the women for an "immoral purpose. 24  Three
Justices dissented. In their view, the purpose of the Act, as particularly
shown by its title, was to make it a crime to engage in "commercialized
sex, immoralities having a mercenary purpose."
In Mortensen v. United States,2 5 the Mortensens, who ran a house of
prostitution in Nebraska, took two of their employees on vacation to Salt
Lake City and Yellowstone Park. The Court reversed their conviction
under the Mann Act, holding that the Act's prohibition of an interstate
trip should not be interpreted to include a trip "undertaken for an
innocent vacation purpose.' 26 "[W]hat Congress has outlawed.., is the
use of interstate commerce as a calculated means for effectuating sexual
immorality. '27 Four Justices dissented, stating that "Courts have no...
concern with the policy and wisdom of the Mann Act., 2 8 The fact was
that "in bringing [the two women] back to Nebraska," the Mortensens
"intended that they should resume there the practice of commercialized
,,29
vice.
In Cleveland v. United States,30 the Court reviewed the conviction
of six members of the Mormon Church who believed in polygamy and
had transported their wives across state lines. The Court affirmed their
conviction, holding that "polygamous practices have long been branded
as immoral in the law., 3 1 One Justice dissented on the ground that
Congress's prohibition of "any other immoral purpose" should be
interpreted to refer to practices such as "prostitution" and "debauchery"
and not to "one of the basic forms of marriage" recognized since ancient
32times.
The Discussion Leader might ask the group if they think the
decisions in Caminetti, Mortensen, and Cleveland are consistent.
"Should courts be consistent? If their decisions are unpredictable, you
cannot have a rule of law, can you? How do you explain why the
22. Id.
23. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
24. Id. at 485-86.
25. Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944).
26. Id. at 375.
27. Id. at 375.
28. Id. at 377.
29. Id. at 378.
30. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id. at 25-26.
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justices so disagreed among themselves?"
This last question may lead to the second issue raised by Captain
Vere's argument to the members of the court martial: his assertion that
"Nature," or morality, and "the law" are distinct, and that judges should
be concerned to enforce the law, not morality. As he puts it, Captain
Vere's argument invites the response: Suppose the Mutiny Act provided
that Billy Budd should be executed because he was a Jew. Would the
court still be obliged to condemn him to death? Is there not some point
at which a law, even though duly enacted by the organ of government
authorized to enact laws, ceases to be "law" to which a judge must be
"faithful"? One of the members of the court martial in Billy Budd
wanted to withdraw, on the ground that he felt unable to enforce a law as
"pitiless" as the Mutiny Act (as interpreted by Captain Vere). Was he
right? The Discussion Leader may ask whether the judges in Nazi
Germany and Vichy France should have refused to enforce the laws
providing for the transportation of Jews to slave labor and gas ovens.
A great deal has been written on whether the force of a law, and,
hence, a judge's responsibility to uphold it, depends on the extent of its
conformance to some conception of justice. At this point, the Discussion
Leader may well wish to refer the participants to some of the writings
that debate the issue.33 I suggest, however, that the Discussion Leader be
wary, lest the course run off track. The purpose of the course is not to
study the philosophy of the law but, as mentioned above, to help non-
lawyers understand a judge's responsibilities by asking them to confront
the problems a judge encounters. In real life, our judges don't much
worry about whether they should refuse to enforce a law because it is so
immoral as not to deserve enforcement; the United States *is not Nazi
Germany. But that is not to say that they do not worry about the
relationship between law and morality. It is only that their worry takes a
different form. It is not as agonizing as it must have been for some of the
German and French judges, but it is agonizing enough.
Judges' personal standards of morality do not vanish when they
ascend the bench. Instead, judges know that when they interpret a
statute, their responsibility is to determine what the legislature meant.
But to what extent is that determination affected by their personal
standards? "Consider the Mann Act cases," the Discussion Leader may
say, "do you think that the justices' different interpretations of the
legislature's word, 'immoral,' was affected by their own view of what
was 'immoral'?" "Or," the Discussion Leader may go on to ask, "do you
33. My own selection would be LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
For provocative and accessible collections of readings summarizing conflicting positions,
see ARTHUR & SHAW, supra note 18, and ALDISERT, supra note 2.
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think, upon reflection, that your decision whether to convict or acquit
Billy Budd was affected by your personal view of the morality of the
death penalty? How can a judge draw the line between giving too much
and too little weight to personal morality?"
Finally, the Discussion Leader may ask the participants how open a
judge should be in acknowledging tension between public and personal
standards. Consider the case of a Florida judge who wrote two letters to
his local newspaper and an article for his church newsletter.34 In these
writings, he stated his opposition to capital punishment, but also stated
that he would enforce the law providing for capital punishment.3' The
Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission recommended that the judge
be disciplined, but the Florida Supreme Court rejected the
recommendation, stating that a judge
in an appropriate forum may express his protest, dissent, and
criticism of the present state of the law as long as he does not appear
to substitute his concept of what the law ought to be for what the law
actually is, and as long as he expresses himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in his integrity and impartiality as a
judge.
36
The rule of law posits judges following what the law actually is, not
what they think the law ought to be. But the law may be unjust; criticism
may make it better. "Would you have disciplined the Florida judge?" the
Discussion Leader may ask.
Two points are at issue: one, a judge's responsibility to determine
what the law is, and then to be faithful to the law; and two, a judge's
responsibility not to say or do things that raise doubts about the judge's
faithfulness. The Discussion Leader should make this distinction clear.
Some Discussion Leaders may prefer to defer discussion of the second
issue-which was the issue in the case of the Florida judge-until later,
when considering a judge's responsibility to be impartial, both in fact
and in appearance. The advantage of discussing the Florida judge early
is that doing so emphasizes the tension that may arise within a judge
who, according to Captain Vere, "flinches" from recognizing and
following the law.
In closing the session, the Discussion Leader may point out that "the
law" does not only include statutes, such as the Mutiny Act or Mann Act,
but also judge-made law, or common law, to be considered in the next
session.
34. In re Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 1982).
35. Id. at 954.
36. Id.
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D. The Fourth Session: Competence: The Common Law
The phrases "the rule of law" and "faithful to the law" at least
imply, if they do not state explicitly, that a judge is to reach out to a body
of rules already in existence. "If that isn't what judges do," the
Discussion Leader may ask, "but instead they create new rules, are we
not being ruled not by law but by judges?" From their discussion up to
this point, the participants will have learned that when judges may differ
when interpreting a statute. But judges do not differ about their
responsibility. They agree that their responsibility is to try to find the
legislature's intention--not to create it. But judges do create, and know
they create, the common law.
These are deep waters, dangerous to navigate. But here is a
suggestion on how to do it.
In 1920, the dean of the Yale Law School asked Benjamin Cardozo,
then a judge on the New York Court of Appeals, to deliver the Storrs
Lectures. At first, Cardozo declined, but he made an appointment to
meet the dean and faculty. There a faculty member asked, "Judge
Cardozo, could you not explain to our students the process by which you
arrive at the decision of a case, with the sources to which you go for
assistance?" "With a bird-like movement of the head, and a mere
moment of hesitation, [Cardozo] replied: 'I believe I could do that."'
37
The resulting lectures were published as The Nature of the Judicial
Process,38 and in my view, they are still the best description of what
judges actually do.
As Professor Kaufman, in his biography of Cardozo, observes: "The
proper role of the judge has been the subject of a continuous debate that
has renewed itself in every generation because judicial law-making both
reflects and affects American institutions, politics, and society. '39 I
remain uncertain whether this continuous debate should be retraced as
part of the course for non-lawyers that I am urging.40 An advantage of
doing so would be to place into context the current vociferous insistence
that judges should determine and enforce the "original intent" of the
authors of the Constitution as a resurfacing of the equally vociferous late
nineteenth century insistence that judges do not make the law, they find
it. Also, some balance might be provided to the assertion by some
critical legal scholars that legal doctrine is so "indeterminate" that judges
37. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 203-04 (1998) (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, The
Judicial Process Revisited: Introduction, 71 YALE L.J. 195, 197-98 (1961)).
38. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, TH-E NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
39. KAUFMAN, supra note 37, at 200.
40. If the Discussion Leader decides to do this, Professor Kaufman's summary of it
would be a good place to start. Id.; see also CASS, supra note 5, at 46-97.
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"decide cases any way they wish and then dress up the result in
traditional legal language. ' A
I believe, however, that this tempting debate should probably be
avoided, except perhaps in a college course, for the materials that would
have to be read are too extensive. Put differently, they are too long a
way around to the main point, which is to give the participants a sense of
the way judges think when faced with a problem not controlled by a
statute. Better, I suggest, to push the participants in and let them swim.
Asking them to discuss the majority and dissenting opinions in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision in TB. v. L.R.M.42 should
do the trick.
In TB., the court reconsidered the proper definition of the judge-
made doctrine of in loco parentis. T.B. and L.R.M. were two women
who lived together and decided to have a child.43 They agreed that
L.R.M. would be impregnated and T.B. would pick the donor.44 When
the child was born, in August 1993, L.R.M. and T.B. shared the
responsibilities of caring for the child and the child referred to T.B. as
her "aunt. ''4  In May 1996, L.R.M. and T.B. bought a new home.46
Shortly afterwards, T.B. left to have a relationship with another woman,
and, in August 1996, L.R.M and T.B. separated.47 T.B. visited the child
in September 1996, but, thereafter, L.R.M. refused to permit her to visit
or telephone the child.48
T.B. argued that she should be granted visitation because she had
acted as the child's parent for more than three years while she and
L.R.M. lived together.49 L.R.M. argued that T.B. had no standing to sue
for visitation. 50  Affirming the Superior Court, the majority of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that T.B. did have standing and
remanded for a hearing on whether visitation would be in the child's best
interests. 51 The way the majority reached this decision nicely illustrates
how judges develop the common law.
41. KAUFMAN, supra note 37, at 200. Kaufman notes that this claim is usually not
made in such blunt language but "more elliptical[ly]." Id. at 636 n.5.
42. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001). Of course, other cases might be
chosen, for example, Judge Cardozo's most famous decision, Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (illustrating judge-made law of when a duty of care
arises).
43. TB., 786 A.2d at 914.







51. ld. at 920.
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Until the Court's decision, the doctrine of in loco parentis had never
been held to give standing to a third party like T.B. In the opinion of the
dissenting justices, it should not have been expanded to include her.
52
The dissenting justices stated that "deference" should be given to the
"long recognized" and "fundamental" "interest of the natural parent in
raising her child without government interference (including being
forced to defend that interest in court)." '53 The dissenting justices
supported their view by reference to the Domestic Relations Code, which
they read as "imply[ing] that child custody disputes are understood as
occurring primarily within the framework of biological or legal parenting
and the break-up of an attendant marital relationship., 54 They noted that,
under Pennsylvania law, T.B. and L.R.M. could not marry, and they cited
language in earlier cases to the effect that the doctrine of in loco parentis
described a relationship in which one assumed the rights and
responsibilities of a "lawful parent."55 They also noted that the only
statutory reference to the doctrine of in loco parentis employed the
doctrine to give standing to a grandparent.
56
The majority acknowledged the authorities relied upon by the
dissent but read them very differently. The majority held that the
statutory provisions relied upon by the dissent were irrelevant; the
doctrine of in loco parentis was "entrenched in our common law "and
could not be "repeal[ed] by implication. 57 With regard to the rights of
L.R.M. as the child's biological mother, the majority adopted a statement
by the Superior Court:
[w]hile it is presumed that a child's best interest is served by
maintaining the family's privacy and autonomy, that presumption
must give way where the child has established strong psychological
bonds with a person who, although not a biological parent, has lived
with the child and provided care, nurture, and affection, assuming in
the child's eye a stature like that of a parent.
58
On this view, it was of "no legal significance" that T.B. could not
marry L.R.M. or adopt the child.59 Instead, the question was whether she
had "assumed a parental status and discharged parental duties., 60 The
52. Id. at 921.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 922.
56. Id. at 921.
57. Id. at 918.
58. Id. at 917 (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1319-20 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996)).
59. Id. at 918.
60. Id. at 918-19.
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record was clear that she had. Furthermore, it was clear that she had
done so with L.R.M.'s acquiescence and encouragement. Accordingly,
the case was "not a case where the third party assumed the parental status
against the wishes of a biological parent.",
6 1
After discussing T.B., the Discussion Leader might state the four
methods Cardozo identified as those he used when he decided a case:
one, logic-reasoning from cases and principles of law already
established; two, "the line of historical development ... [and] the method
of evolution"; three, "the customs of the community ... [and] the
method of tradition"; and, four, "the lines of justice, morals and social
welfare." 62 "Which of these methods," the Discussion Leader might ask,
"did the justices in TB. v. L.R.M use?"
Like Cardozo, the majority justices in TB. started with the case law.
The participants should be asked to criticize the majority's analysis.
Among the cases relied upon by the majority was Bupp v. Bupp,63 which
rejected a biological mother's contention that her boyfriend had no
standing to invoke the doctrine of in loco parentis.64 Granted, this case
represents an extension of the doctrine beyond family members, but does
it support an extension to include a member of a same sex couple? The
majority noted that to refuse T.B. standing "could potentially affect the
rights of stepparents, aunts, uncles or other family members who have
raised children., 65 But are such "family members" analogous to T.B.?
As noted above, the dissenting justices relied principally on implications
they found in certain statutes. Reminding the participants of their
discussion of the Mann Act during the third session, the Discussion
Leader should ask whether the implications were as clear as the dissent
said they were.
Neither the majority nor the dissenting justices discussed historical
development. Why not? The majority might have assembled
considerable evidence of change in the notion of what constitutes a
"family," and whether it is still presumed that it is in a child's best
interests to be in the custody of the biological mother.66 Would such
evidence have strengthened the majority's reading of the cases?
The dissenting justices' argument that various statutes reflected a
61. Id. at 919.
62. CARDOZO, supra note 38, at 30-3 1.
63. TB., 786 A.2d at 918 n.7 (citing Bupp v. Bupp 718 A.2d. 1278 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 917.
66. For a review of changes in domestic relations law in response to changes in the
conception of a "family," see Siobhan Morrissey, The New Neighbors: Domestic
Relations Law Struggles To Catch Up with Changes in Family Life, A.B.A. J., Mar.
2002, at 37.
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"legislative policy" that custody disputes should be resolved in "the
context of legally recognized familial relationships,' 67 appears to be an
invocation of what Cardozo might have described as "customs of the
community" or "tradition." Thus the dissenting justices described "the
statute's focus" as "the long-recognized interest of the natural parent in
raising her child without governmental interference. 68  But surely
community beliefs and attitudes have changed as regards gays and
lesbians.69 Why did the majority justices not point that out? Did they
wish to avoid seeming to approve of the change? Did they think
comment unnecessary? Would their opinion have been more forthright if
they had taken the issue of attitude head-on? More controversial? Might
the dissenting justices have acknowledged change but argued that a court
should not encourage it, but that it should be reversed? When feeling its
way, is a court wise to say as little as possible? Does that make
evolution of the law easier or harder?
The opinions are mostly silent on considerations of "justice, morals
and social welfare." The dissenting justices acknowledged that T.B. had
"established close relationships" with the child and was "sincere[ly]
interested in [the child's] well being. 70  Yet, the dissenting justices
denominated these "important concerns" as simply "competing
considerations" that the legislature had decided were insufficient to
confer standing on T.B. to seek custody.71  The majority justices
probably considered their emphasis that the law should serve the child's
best interests as a statement of what was in the social welfare. Although
the majority justices did not specifically discuss morals, they did
emphasize that L.R.M., having "voluntarily created and actively
fostered" the relationship between T.B. and the child, should not now be
able to exclude T.B. "simply because after the parties' separation she
regretted having done so.' ' 72 This reasoning sounds like reasoning from
consideration of justice and fairness.
Having worked through the majority and dissenting opinions73 in
TB. in some such manner, the Discussion Leader may wish to end by
67. TB., 786 A.2d at 923.
68. Id. at 921.
69. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (relying almost entirely on
tradition to uphold a Georgia statute that made sodomy a crime), with Powell v. State,
510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (invalidating that same Georgia statute and holding that the
Georgia Constitution provided protection for sexual acts that occurred without force in
the private home between persons legally capable to consent to the acts).
70. TB., 786 A.2d at 922.
71. Id. at 922-23.
72. Id. at 919 (quoting J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).
73. There was also a concurring opinion by Justice Cappy. Id. at 920 (emphasizing
that the court had "never considered" the ability to marry the biological parent or to adopt
the child determinative of the right to seek custody).
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taking on the challenge of many critics of the courts. Did the majority
justices impose personal values not shared by "ordinary citizens" and
"disrespectful of tradition and traditionally important institutions"? 74 Do
the majority and dissenting opinions taken together show that judges can
"decide cases any way they wish"? 75 Or the Discussion Leader may
prefer simply to state these question as the subject of the next session.
E. The Fifth Session: Constraints on Judicial Decision Making
From their examination of the Mann Act cases and T.B., the
participants will be familiar to some degree with the constraints that
judges feel when they decide a case. But further examination is
warranted about two particular constraints: one, the doctrine of stare
decisis, and, two, the obligation to explain the basis of a decision.
The strength of the doctrine of stare decisis as a constraint on
judicial decision making is dramatically illustrated by the opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.76  In this case, Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Souter refused to overrule a decision that they clearly did
not agree with: whether there is a constitutional right to an abortion.
This issue is one of the most divisive in the United States. I suggest,
however, that it should not be avoided because there can be no
understanding of a judge's responsibilities without recognizing that in
our society, the most divisive issues regularly assume the form of legal
claims that the courts must decide. "I recognize, and respect, your
personal opinion about abortion," the Discussion Leader may say, "but
what do you think of the three justices' conclusion that overruling Roe v.
WadeE77) 'would subvert the Court's legitimacy?' 78 Do you agree, at
least, that that was a legitimate concern?"
While Planned Parenthood illustrates the strength of the doctrine of
stare decisis, it also illustrates its limits. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Scalia announced that "Roe was plainly wrong,, 79 and criticized
the joint opinion as a "lengthy lecture," 80 "not reasoned judgment" 81 but
"emptiness." 82 Justice Scalia's statements illustrate judicial arrogance,
the precise sin the doctrine of stare decisis is designed to curb.
74. CASS, supra note 5, at 110 (referring to criticisms by Robert Bork, Thomas
Sewell, and Richard Epstein, among others).
75. See supra note 33.
76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
77. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 867.
79. Id. at 982-83.
80. Id at 997.
81. Id. at 982.
82. Id. at 983.
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Perhaps the greatest constraint on a judge's ability to manipulate
legal principles to reach whatever result he or she want-a constraint
even stronger than stare decisis-is the obligation to explain the basis of
a decision.83 This constraint is illustrated by Hollis Alpert's savage short
story, "The Home of a Stranger., 84 An American army officer with
General Patton's army examines the site of a camp where Jews were
exterminated. The army's advance interrupted the camp's operations;
the dead are lying where they were machine gunned and trenches are
filled with bodies covered only with lime. When the officer returns to
the German woman's home where he is billeted, the officer and his aide
proceed to smash her china, stomp on her plants, rip up her sheets and
blankets, and otherwise vandalize the home. They end by plugging the
kitchen sink and turning on its faucets. As they leave, the aide says,
"That woman isn't going to understand. She won't know why we did it."
"All the better," the officer replies. "No," the aide says, "we should have
left her a note. 85
The "judges" in this story are the officer and his aide. "Should they
have left a note?" the Discussion Leader may ask. "What might they
have said? Was she responsible for the extermination camp? Had she
known about it or in some way supported it? If the officer and his aide
had felt obliged to explain why they were punishing her, might they have
acted differently? Have you ever found yourself changing your mind
when you tried to explain your decision?"
Just as the officer and his aide might not have done what they did if
they had felt obliged to explain their actions before they did them, so a
judge may end by writing an opinion coming out a different way than his
initial "hunch"-and most judges will admit that they do often "hunch" a
case. A legal opinion is an art form, as much as a sonnet or sonata.
Every opinion must be supported factually, by citing to the record, and
legally, by citing case law, statutes or treatises. Every citation must
withstand scrutiny, and to withstand scrutiny, standards must be
followed. For example, the evidence must be read in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner.86 If the jury accepted the plaintiffs
version of the facts as true, a judge's citation will not withstand scrutiny
if it relies on the defendant's version of the facts. Similiarly, to
83. If I may be forgiven for citing myself on the importance of a written opinion, see
Commonwealth v. Riggins, 332 A.2d 521, 529 n.6 (1974) (Spaeth, J., dissenting).
84. Hollis Alpert, The Home of a Stranger, in THE NEW YORKER, June 10, 1950, at
26-29.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Sell v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (LNP Eng'g), 771 A.2d 1246 (Pa.
2001) (holding that on appeal the court must read the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prevailing party below).
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withstand scrutiny, citation to a case must be only to support a
proposition for which the case stands. 87 These formal requirements do
not preclude disagreement, as the participants will have learned from
their examination of the Mann Act cases and TB. But they do constrain
arbitrariness, and they have changed many a judge's mind.
This session will conclude the examination of a judge's
responsibility to be competent. By now, the participants will have
learned about, and will themselves have tried to use, some of a judge's
tools. Thus, they will have more than a glimmering of an idea of how
difficult it may be to determine what the "law" is and how to be
"faithful" to it.
F. The Sixth Session: Impartiality
This session opens with an excerpt from the film, "Rambling
Rose. '8 The story takes place in a small town in Georgia, in the 1930's.
Rose was a sweet, young homeless woman when the Hilliers, a well-to-
do family, took her in. Since then, Rose has taken care of the Hilliers'
three children. The Hilliers and their children have become very fond of
her. Rose is also pretty and sexually active, and the Hilliers have
decided she must leave. Meanwhile, however, Rose has become sick and
the Hilliers have asked their doctor to examine her.
In the excerpt from the film, Mr. and Mrs. Hillier and their doctor
are discussing Rose's sickness. Addressing Mr. Hillier, the doctor
reports that he has diagnosed Rose's condition as an ovarian cyst and he
recommends that she undergo a complete hysterectomy. He says that
ordinarily he would not make such a recommendation because the
procedure will make Rose less sexually attractive. He explains,
however, that the operation will reduce Rose's sexual activity, which he
attributes to emotional dysfunction. Nothing is said explicitly, but at
least some viewers will have a queasy feeling that the doctor and Mr.
Hillier have themselves been sexually attracted to Rose and may even
have been rebuffed by her.
When Mr. Hillier accepts the doctor's recommendation, Mrs. Hillier
becomes outraged. She accuses the two men of conspiring against Rose.
She then turns on her husband, telling him that she had thought of him as
"a good man" and cannot believe that he would agree that Rose should
suffer such a terrible operation. Mr. Hillier, visibly shaken, says that the
doctor's recommendation seemed "right" and in Rose's best interests, but
87. See Weinberg v. Sun Co., Inc., 777 A.2d 442 (Pa. 2001) (reversing a Superior
Court decision that cited a case defining attorney general's burden of proof as though it
defined a private plaintiffs).
88. RAMBLING ROSE (Carolco Pictures 1991).
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he soon admits that he had not given the matter enough thought. In the
end he agrees with his wife that neither Rose nor any other young
woman should suffer such an operation. "You were right," he tells her,
"and I was wrong."
The Discussion Leader may use this scene to develop several points.
One point is that the doctor and the Hilliers were engaged in the same
sort of inquiry as were the judges in TM: what was in Rose's best
interests? Two, a judge must listen to all the arguments before deciding
(who was the judge? Mr. Hillier?). Three, each party should be
represented (who represented Rose? Mrs. Hillier?). Four, if the parties
and public are to have confidence in the court's decision, it is important
for the court to include judges of different backgrounds and perspectives
(Mrs. Hillier's prespective was very different from the men's
prespective). Finally, as in "The Home of a Stranger," when one is
trying to explain or defend one's position, one's explanation may lead to
a change of mind (that happened to Mr. Hillier). But the main point to
be developed is that the decision of a conscientious, technically
competent judge may go askew because of unconscious bias.
The participants may argue that the doctor and Mr. Hillier were
consciously biased, even perhaps, that they were taking revenge on Rose
because she had rebuffed them. The Discussion Leader should ask them,
however, to take the doctor and Mr. Hillier at their word; assume that,
however mistaken, the doctor was sincere in his belief that his
recommendation was in Rose's best interests and that Mr. Hillier
believed that the doctor was "right." "Do you think," the Discussion
Leader may ask, "that you have any unconscious biases that may affect
important decisions you must make? How do you guard against them?
How should a judge?"
Such questions will lead easily to a discussion of Susan Glaspell's
short story, "A Jury of Her Peers.,,89 A sherrif and county attorney
investigate the death of a farmer, who has been strangled. The farmer's
wife is arrested and the two men, with their wives along, go to inspect
the farmhouse. In the course of their investigation, the men make many
condescending remarks about women's abilities to the general effect that
women are not good for much beyond managing a home. In the end, the
men learn nothing from their inspection of the house. The two women,
however, not only deduce why the farmer's wife killed her husband; they
discover, and agree to hide, the evidence that would convict her.
"So," the Discussion Leader may say, "the men were blind, weren't
they? And they didn't know it. How can judges be sure they're not
89. Susan Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers (1917), reprinted in SOCIAL INSIGHT
THROUGH SHORT STORIES 62 (Josephine Strode ed., 1946).
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blind, without knowing it? What perhaps unconscious bias other than
gender should a judge be alert to? Racial? Ethnic?"
"A Jury of Her Peers" was written in 1917, when women couldn't
serve on a jury--much less be lawyers. The story, thus, is a stinging
reminder of how beliefs that are unquestioned and widely held may
prove grievously wrong. Is this not another way of saying that the rule
of law, or perhaps the judges who declare the law, may be wrong, not ill-
willed but wrong nevertheless?9" With this somber comment, the
discussion may end, to resume for a discussion even more somber at the
next session.
G. The Seventh Session: Impartiality
Many of the participants will be familiar with The Merchant of
Venice (The Merchant). The Discussion Leader should, however, have a
copy of the play, to be able to quote from it. Technically, The Merchant
is a comedy because it has a happy ending: Bassanio wins Portia. But in
fact, very little light illuminates its darkness. For this course, the play
may be used to explore two points: actual bias in the law (as
distinguished from the unconscious bias seen in "Rambling Rose" and
"A Jury of Her Peers"), and the relationship between justice and mercy.
Clearly, Shylock is a sort of monster. His hatred of Antonio is
understandable and in some sense, justified: ".. . many a time and oft/ In
the Rialto you have rated me/ About my moneys and my usances/...
You call me misbeliever, cut throat dog/ and spit upon my Jewish
gabardine/... You spumed me .... ,,91 His hatred, however, hardly
excuses his determination to cut off Antonio's flesh and let him bleed to
death.92 But judges must quite often deal with people who do, or try to
do, terrible things. How should judges do it?
What I am about to say will provoke disagreement; discussion of
The Merchant always does. But, in my view, Portia shows exactly how
judges should not act. She is as cruel as Shylock. Judge Posner has said
that The Merchant "takes the side of equity against law in law's narrow
90, "A Jury of Her Peers" has provoked extensive comment. See, e.g., Marijane
Camilleri, Lessons in Law from Literature: A Look at the Movement and a Peer at Her
Jury, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 557 (1990). If the course includes extra assigned reading, as it
well might if given for high school seniors or college undergraduates, the Discussion
Leader might wish to include some feminist jurisprudence. See, e.g., Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1988). On whether the presence of
women judges makes a difference, see Elaine Martin, Women on the Bench: A Different
Voice?, 77 JUDICATURE 126 (1993); Jilda M. Oliotta, Justice O'Connor and the Equal
Protection Clause: A Feminine Voice?, 8 JUDICATURE 232 (1995).
91. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3, 11. 104-27
(William Lyon Phelps ed., Yale University Press 1923).
92. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 256-60.
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sense of a set of mechanically, unfairly, unimaginatively enforced
rules." 93 I find this reading strange. Portia does, famously, urge Shylock
to "be merciful, '94 going on to describe mercy "as the gentle rain from
heaven.., an attribute to God himself."95 But when Shylock demands
"the law,"96 she hardly gives him "equity."
First, Portia pretends to decide in Shylock's favor, declaring
Antonio's bond "forfeit ' 97 and entering judgment in Shylock's favor.
"A pound of that same merchant's flesh is thine./ The court awards it,
and the law doth give it."'98 Then, as Shylock is about to execute on his
judgment, Portia intervenes. "Tarry a little," 99 she says, and proceeds to
construe the words of the bond allowing "a pound of flesh" to mean
"[taking a pound] without "shed[ing] [o]ne drop of Christian blood,"'00
and she refuses to permit Bassanio to pay Shylock the principal. When
Shylock goes to leave the court, saying that Antonio can keep the
principal, Portia informs Shylock that half his property is forfeit to
Antonio and half to the state, and that his life is "in the mercy/of the
Duke." 1 The Duke then declares that he will spare Shylock's life, on
condition that he becomes a Christian and that he bequeath all he dies
possessed of to his daughter, Jessica, and Lorenzo, a Christian she has
run off with. 0 2 When Portia asks, "Art thou contented, Jew? What dost
thou say?"' 0 3 Shylock replies, "I am content,"' 4 and leaves, promising
to sign whatever papers are necessary. This is equity?
Portia's construction of the terms of Antonio's bond should remind
the participants of their discussion of how to construe the Mutiny Act in
Billy Budd, and the word "immoral" in the Mann Act cases. "Do you
think," the Discussion Leader may ask, "that permission to cut a 'pound
of flesh' necessarily implies permission to shed blood?"
But there is more to point out than Portia's questionable
construction of the bond. Portia based her final judgment, forfeiting
Shylock's property and putting his life at the mercy of the Duke, on "the
laws of Venice."' 0 5 That law stated that if "an alien"-and Shylock, as a
93. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 97-
98 (1988).
94. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 91, act 4, sc. 1, 1. 180.
95. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 183-93.
96. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 1. 204.
97. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 1. 228.
98. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 297-98.
99. Id. act 4, sc. 1,1.303.
100. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 305-08.
101. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 353-54.
102. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 378-90.
103. Id. act4, sc. 1,1.391.
104. Id. act 4, sc. 1,1.392.
105. Id. act 4, sc. 1,1.346.
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Jew in Venice, was an alien-directly or indirectly sought the life of any
citizen, that citizen could seize half the alien's property, the state the
other half, and the Duke could condemn him to death. 0 6 Again harking
back to Billy Budd, the Discussion Leader may ask, "It was clear that
Shylock had sought Antonio's life, wasn't it? But was the law cited by
Portia a just law to be enforced? Suppose a citizen sought the life of an
alien. Was that made criminal?"
And finally, the Discussion Leader may press the participants to say
what judgment they would have entered and, accepting the obligation to
explain it, to say why. "Might Portia have declared Antonio's bond
invalid on the ground that no one should be permitted to agree to be
killed, anymore than to be a slave? Would you have let Shylock accept
Bassanio's offer to pay the principal? Or would you have decided to let
Shylock recover nothing?"
In short, The Merchant can serve as a reprise of all of a judge's
responsibilities discussed so far, and with a sinister emphasis. For
Shylock's trial illustrates how oppressive the law can be in the hands of a
judge as skillful and prejudiced as Portia.
The Merchant also brings something new to the discussion: what is
the relationship between justice and mercy? Portia's answer is famous.
When Antonio confesses his bond, she says, "Then must the Jew be
merciful.' 0 7 Mercy, she explains, is "above" the "throned monarch"; it
is "an attribute to God himself"; it "seasons justice. 10 8 Mercy can
"mitigate" justice, but only if Shylock chooses to be merciful. If he
insists upon "justice," Portia says, "this strict court of Venice/Must needs
give sentence 'gainst the merchant there."'
10 9
There are those who agree with Portia that it is no part of a judge's
responsibilities to be merciful:
If mercy requires a tempering of justice, then there is a sense in
which mercy may require a departure from justice .... Thus to be
merciful is perhaps to be unjust ..... We (society) hire this
individual [the judge] to enforce the rule of law under which we live.
We think of this as "doing justice," and the doing of this is surely his
sworn obligation. What business does he have, then, ignoring his
obligations to justice while he pursues some private, idios ncratic,
and not publicly accountable virtue of love or compassion.
Plainly, Captain Vere would agree. In his view, the Mutiny Act had
106. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 346-55.
107. Id. act 4, sc. 1,1. 180.
108. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 187-95.
109. Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 201-03.
110. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 167-68 (1988).
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to be read as a command to order Billy Budd's execution--as an express
prohibition of showing mercy.
A French philosopher, seeking to rank mercy with the other great
virtues, has distinguished it from clemency, "which merely renounces
punishment," and from compassion, "which sympathizes only with
suffering.""' Mercy, he argues, "requires that we understand
something"'' 2 -for example, that the other person is wicked, or
misguided, or ruled by passion-and then that we forgive, which means
"to accept."' 13 Mercy is not the same as love "but [it] stands in for love
when love is not possible."' 1 4 It "triumphs over rancor, over justified
hatred ... over resentment, over the desire for revenge or
punishment."" 15 It does not season or mitigate justice, as Portia argued, it
"goes beyond justice."'" 16
Canon 3B(8) of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires
that "[a] judge shall dispose of all judicial matters ... fairly."
'"17
Interestingly, this requirement is not included in the current Pennsylvania
Code of Judicial Conduct, which became effective on January 1, 1974,
and is modeled after the 1972 version of the ABA Model Code. "Why,"
the Discussion Leader may ask, "is that? What does 'fairly' mean?"
In some instances, notably under sentencing guidelines, a judge's
discretion is so limited as to reach Captain Vere's result: mercy is
excluded. But many situations arise in which, with or without an explicit
command in the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must exercise
discretion or must decide what is "fair." Should a continuance be
granted because the mother of a lawyer to one of the parties has died?
Should a snap judgment be opened? Should proof of a prior conviction
not be allowed? "Do you think judges should be tough, hard-boiled?"
the Discussion Leader may ask. "Or merciful? What is the difference
between being 'merciful' and being 'fair'? Suppose you were in a court
as a victim or as a defendant." Portia concludes:
That in the course of justice none of us should see salvation. We do
pray for mercy, and that same prayer doth teach us all to render the
deeds of mercy. 118
"Can you improve on this conclusion? Are judges exempt from
111. ANDRE CONTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUES 119
(2001).
112. Id. at 121.
113. Id. at 122.
114. Id. at 130.
115. Id. at 119.
116. Id.
117. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B(8).




H. The Eighth Session: Independence
Most of the participants will likely have read To Kill A
Mockingbird"9 (Mockingbird) or have seen the movie in which Gregory
Peck plays the heroic lawyer, Atticus Finch.120 But for the course we are
considering, let us shift the focus from Atticus Finch to the judge: what
does Mockingbird tell us about a judge's responsibilities?
The story takes place in Georgia, in 1935. One must be careful not
to criticize the judge's conduct by standards not applicable at the time,
which was before the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright121 and the segregation cases. The judge was under no
obligation to appoint a lawyer to defend Tom Robinson, much less to
appoint Finch, the best lawyer in town; and the segregated seating in the
courthouse and the segregated jury-all-white male-were not unlawful.
And yet, it is very painful to watch the trial. Robinson never had a
chance. In one sense, Atticus Finch's heroism is that he knew Robinson
never had a chance but he fought for his client as hard as he could
against overwhelming odds.
Where does this leave us? It wouldn't be fair to fault Judge Taylor
for not transforming the community into a place in which a black man
was regarded as equal in the eyes of the law to a white man. With that
said, the trial still was not fair. Robinson knew it wasn't, and so did the
black community. Did Judge Taylor know it wasn't? If not, why not? If
he did know, why didn't he do something, like ordering Mayella Ewell to
answer Atticus Finch's questions, or directing an acquittal on the ground
that the evidence was as a matter of law insufficient to permit a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable, or unprejudiced, doubt?
We are all children of our time, which means that we all have blind
spots, emphatically including our judges, as Dred Scott122 and Plessy v.
Ferguson123 tragically prove, not to mention other decisions blind to the
legitimacy of legislation that would enable people to exercise their
individual rights. 24 The question raised by Mockingbird is: what do we
119. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Warner Books, Inc. 1982) (1960).
120. A few do not regard him as heroic. See Monroe H. Freedman, Atticus
Finch-Right and Wrong, 45 ALA. L. REV. 473 (1994). Professor Freedman's essay is
one of a collection of essays submitted at a symposium on To Kill A Mockingbird.
121. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
122. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
123. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
124. The paradigmatic case, of course, is Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(holding a New York law regulating bakers' hours invalid as an illegal interference with
the bakers' "rights ... to make contracts regarding [their] labor upon such terms as they
may think best").
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mean when we speak of an "independent judiciary"? We mean two
things, do we not? First, we mean a judiciary with an independent vision
of what the law requires--a vision clearer than that of the prosecutor,
who addressed Robinson as "boy," and of the jurors who convicted him
of raping a white girl because he was black. And, second, we mean a
judiciary with the courage to do what the law requires.
We shall never know whether Judge Taylor had such vision and
courage. In the end, Robinson didn't trust the legal system-and who
can blame him? He tried to escape and was killed. But some judges
have had the vision and courage that the ideal of judicial independence
demands:
On June 22, 1933, two months after he had sentenced Haywood
Patterson [one of the Scottsboro boys] to death and postponed the
remaining trials, Judge James E. Horton convened court in his home
town of Athens, Alabama, to hear the defense's motions for a new
trial.
125
Instead of hearing argument, Judge Horton read a seventeen-page
decision, concluding:
The testimony of the prosecutrix in this case is not only
uncorroborated, but it also bears on its face indications of
improbability and is contradicted by other evidence, and in addition
thereto the evidence greatly preponderates in favor of the defendant.
It therefore becomes the duty of the Court under the law to grant the
motion in the case.126
When he read his decision, Judge Horton was in the fifth year of his
second six-year term. 127 "In the primary, in May 1934,. .. he was
decisively defeated."'' 28 We say we want an independent judiciary, but
do we? This question leads to the final session of the course.
I. The Ninth Session: Is the Rule of Law Democratic?
The most frequent and heated criticism of federal judges, and the
most passionate defense of electing state judges, is that judicial review is
"undemocratic" and that judges should be "accountable to the people."
One cannot understand a judge's responsibilities, or decide how we
should select our judges, unless one is able to respond to this claim of
accountability.
In examining how to respond, the Discussion Leader should start, I
125. JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF ScoTrSBORO 172 (1994).
126. Id. at 181-82.
127. Id. at 174.
128. Id. at 207.
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suggest, by noting the extent to which the claim that judges should be
"accountable" is exaggerated. Discussion, and the course, may then
conclude by returning to the quotation from Marbury v. Madison, with
which the course started, and developing the point that if we are to enjoy
"a government of laws, and not of men," 129 sometimes judicial review
must be "undemocratic."
Quite often a complaint that a judicial decision is "undemocratic,"
or "usurps the people's will," has nothing to do with democracy. Often it
is simply a misdirected criticism of the judge's technique, or a failure to
understand the constraints on the judge. As discussion of Billy Budd and
the Mann Act cases should have shown, when judges construe a statute
they are not acting undemocratically. To the contrary, they are trying to
determine what the people, speaking through their elected
representatives, want. When judges expand the common law, as the
majority of the court did in TB., one of the factors they consider is what
Cardozo referred to as "the customs of the community... the method of
tradition ... morals and social welfare."
Sometimes the court's appeal to democratic values is overt, as in the
redistricting cases. In Wesberry v. Sanders,1 30 the Court held that "the
command of Art. 1, §2 [of the Constitution], that Representatives be
chosen 'by the People of the several States' means that as nearly as
practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as
much as another's." ' 31  In Reynolds v. Sims,' 32 the Court ordered
redistricting of state legislative districts on the ground that
[the] right of a citizen to equal representation and to have his vote
weighed equally with those of all other citizens in the election of
members of one house of a bicameral state legislature would amount
to little if States could effectively submerge the equal-population
principle in the apportionment of seats in the other [house]. 133
The court's appeal to democratic values is overt in other areas of the law
as well. In its struggle to define prohibitable obscenity, the Court has
referenced to "contemporary community standards."' 34 In considering
whether the death penalty may be cruel and unusual punishment, the
Court has referred to "consensus."'
' 35
There are other cases where the courts, far from being
129. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
130. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
131. Id. at 7-8.
132. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
133. Id. at 576.
134. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
135. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (2002).
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undemocratic, have sought to enhance democracy. Perhaps the most
striking and influential of these cases is New York Times v. Sullivan.'
36
There, the Court held that a state may not constitutionally provide that a
libeled public official may recover damages unless the defendant proves
that the stated facts were "true in all their particulars."' 37 "[D]ebate on
public issues," the Court said, "should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open." 138 In such debate, some erroneous statements are inevitable and
some allowance must be made. Accordingly, the Court held that a public
official may not recover damages for a defamatory statement "relative to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not."'
' 39
But when all this has been said, the fact remains that judicial review
sometimes is, and should be, undemocratic. If Judge Taylor had granted
Tom Robinson a new trial, as Judge Horton granted a new trial in the
Scottsboro Cases, the result would without doubt have been against the
will of almost everyone in the community. "How is it," the Discussion
Leader may ask, "that in a democracy we permit such a result? Do a
judge's responsibilities require that sometimes the judge must be
undemocratic? How does a judge decide when that is?"
The discussion should then turn to the United States Constitution,
1 40
starting with the preamble. The government created by the Constitution
is our government: "We the People of the United States [have]
ordain[ed] and establish[ed] it.' 141  But, as Madison observed, "[i]n
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."'
42
There are three ways in which the Constitution tries to solve this
difficulty.
First, the Constitution gives the government limited powers. The
Framers judged these powers to be enough, but no more than enough, to
"enable the government to control the governed." At this point, the
136. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
137. Id. at 267.
138. Id. at 270.
139. Id. at 279-280. Of course, many other cases might be chosen by the Discussion
Leader. E.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (justifying
judicial intervention where legislation "restricts ... political processes," in its famous
footnote 4). But remember, this is a course for non-lawyers.
140. A pocket-sized copy of the Constitution has been printed by the National
Constitution Center written for non-lawyers by Professors Akhil Amar and Douglas
Kmiec. It contains an excellent introduction, a copy of the Declaration of Independence,
a list of important dates, and a useful index.
141. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
142. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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Discussion Leader should briefly discuss federalism somewhat as
follows (the discussion will have to be expanded later). To enable the
people to speak as a Nation, the Constitution gives the federal
government powers at the expense of the states. For example, the federal
government has the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States"'143 to "coin money," 144 and to "declare
War." 145 But many powers not given to the federal government remain
with the state governments, 146 and each state may exercise its powers
differently. For example, one state government may declare conduct a
crime that another state government permits, or one state government
may impose taxes that another does not. 147 Thus, each of us is subject to
two governments: federal and state.
Second, to inhibit hasty or arbitrary exercise of the limited powers
that are given to the federal government, the Constitution divides the
federal government into three parts: the legislative,
48 the executive, 49
and the judicial. 150  Furthermore, each part may check the other. For
example, the executive may veto action by the legislature,' 5 ' or the
legislature may refuse to give approval required before executive action
may become effective.152 At this point, the Discussion Leader may ask
the participants to go through the Constitution and identify as many such
checks and balances as they can.
Third, the people, deteremined not to be oppressed by their new
federal government, specified specific rights that are not to be violated.
Some of these rights are found in the Constitution itself, as, for example
the prohibition of passage of an ex post facto law. 153 Other are found in
the supplemental Bill of Rights, 5 4 forbidding the government to "make
[any] law" denying certain treasured individual rights, as, for example,
"the freedom of speech,"' 155 "the right ... against unreasonable searches
and seizures,"' 156 and "the right [in all criminal prosecutions] to a speedy
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
147. To illustrate this, the Discussion Leader should be able to refer to the
constitution of the state in which the course is being presented.
148. U.S. CONST. art. I.
149. U.S. CONST. art. II
150. U.S. CONST. art. III.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
152. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing for Senate approval of, inter alia, treaties,
ambassadors, judges),
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
154. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
156. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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and public trial, by an impartial jury.' 5 7 Again, the Discussion Leader
may ask the participants to identify the rights promised them. The
Discussion Leader should also refer the participants to their state
constitution, noting that it also promises rights, which may differ from
those promised by the federal constitution.
Upon completing this exercise, the participants will be ready to turn
to Marbury v. Madison.'58 I should give them a copy of Marbury, for it
is one of the foundation documents of our nation (and, besides, I admire
the Chief Justices's haughty style). 159 The Discussion Leader should
explain the background disagreement between the Federalists and
Republicans to indicate what was at stake: whose conception of how
strong the federal government should be should prevail. 160  The
Discussion Leader should also explain some technical matters, in
particular, what is a writ of mandamus and what is the difference
between original and appellate jurisdiction. I know from my own
experience that non-lawyer groups are perfectly capable of accurately
grasping these technicalities.
Marbury may be summarized as follows. The Constitution gave the
Court appellate power. Appellate power does not include the power to
issue a writ of mandamus. Nevertheless, Congress passed an act giving
the Court the power to issue a writ of mandamus. The Court held that
when the legislature passes an act that is thus "repugnant" to the
Constitution, the Court must hold the act invalid and as of no effect.161
The Discussion Leader should emphasize the Court's holding. It
must not be fudged. "Isn't it clear," the Discussion Leader may ask,
"that in Marbury, the Court acted undemocratically by declaring an act
of the people's duly elected representatives invalid? But, wasn't that the
157. U.S. CONST., amend VI.
158. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
159. For example: "The question whether an act, repugnant to the constitution, can
become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but,
happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest." Id. at 176. Indeed!
160. See, e.g., JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 296-326
(1996); see also WILLIAM SAFIRE, THE SCANDALMONGER (2000). Smith's exposition is
marvelous and perfectly accessible to a non-lawyer, and might well be assigned in an
undergraduate course.
161. For a contrary view, see Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825)
(Gibson, J., dissenting) (rejecting Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning and arguing to deny
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court authority to hold unconstitutional an act of the state
legislature). Compare LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958) (finding
"nothing in The United States Constitution that gave courts any authority to review the
decisions of Congress"), with HERBERT WECHSLER, TOWARD NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, IN PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 4-10 (1961)
(finding no escape from the obligation of review). I do not consider, however, that
intellectual honesty requires discussion of these, or comparable materials. Agree or not,
Marbury is settled law.
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Court's unavoidable responsibility? If you disagree, then how do you
answer the Chief Justice's argument that not to declare the act invalid
would make the legislature omnipotent? Suppose Congress, by
overwhelming vote, enacted a law that atheists couldn't vote, or that
persons who criticized the conduct of a war committed a crime. Could a
judge avoid declaring both laws invalid?"
Having demonstrated the federal courts' power of judicial review,
the Discussion Leader should return to federalism and the state courts.
After all, a primary purpose of the course is to consider the
responsibilities of state judges, not only federal. To this end, the syllabus
suggests that the Discussion Leader should review Cohens v. Virginia,
62
Brown v. Board of Education,
163 and Duncan v. Louisiana.'64
In Cohens, the issue was whether the United States Supreme Court
had authority to review the decision of a state court that applied state law
in a state criminal trial. Philip and Mendes Cohen had sold tickets for a
national lottery authorized by Congress. They were convicted and fined
for violating a Virginia statute prohibiting the sale of out-of-state lottery
tickets. The issue was whether Virginia's statute was inconsistent with
the act of Congress authorizing the national lottery. The Virginia courts
had held that it was not.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Virginia argued that
the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the Cohens' appeal. This argument
was a high-water mark of the compact theory of states rights-the
theory, as Jefferson put it, that the federal and state governments are
"equally supreme," "as independent as different nations."' 65  On this
view, the Supreme Court of Virginia was as competent as the Supreme
Court of the United States to say whether a state law violated the
Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall's rejection of Virginia's argument
remains one of his most eloquent statements:
[T]he American people are one .... The people have declared, that
in the exercise of all powers given [the federal government by the
Constitution] ... it is supreme. It can, then, in effecting these
objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments within the
American territory. The constitution and laws of a State, so far as
162. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); see also Dartmouth College
v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (holding the New Hampshire legislature's
modification of Dartmouth's charter a violation of the contract clause); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding the Maryland legislature's imposition
of a tax on the Second Bank of the United States a violation of the necessary and proper
clause and rejecting the claim that the Constitution recognizes the states as sovereigns
equal to the federal government).
163. Brown v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
164. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
165. See SMITh, supra note 160, at 466.
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they are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States,
are absolutely void. 166
Thus, after Cohens, a state judge must consider, not only what state
law requires, but whether state law violates the federal constitution.
After the Civil War, with approval of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the limitations on state action were expanded: "Nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
' 167
It was not until decades later that these limitations were recognized.
In Brown, the Court held that a state that required black children to
attend segregated schools denied them "the equal protection of the
laws. ' 68 In Duncan, the Court held that the provision of the Louisiana
Constitution granting the right to trial by jury only in capital cases and
cases where imprisonment at hard labor could be imposed denied "due
process of law." 169 The Discussion Leader should note that in defining
"due process" the Court has turned to the Bill of Rights. Thus, in
Duncan, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial by
jury in criminal cases is such a basic right that it must be included in the
concept of "due process," and other cases have held equally basic other
rights guaranteed by the first eight amendments, such as the rights of
speech, press and religion.'
70
And so the examination of the duty of judicial review, with its
possible "undemocratic" consequences, may conclude. Permit me,
however, to state a concluding caution, which should perhaps have been
expressed at the outset: Just beneath examination of how judges decide,
passions rage. Issues that engage deep feelings are confronted
throughout the course: the states' rights fervor that erupted with Cohens,
and later with the Civil War; the racism confronted in Brown and
illustrated in Mockingbird; the religious prejudice in the Merchant;
disagreements about sex and morality in "Rambling Rose," "A Jury of
166. Cohens, 19 U.S. at 413-14.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
168. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
169. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62.
170. The Discussion Leader should no doubt be careful not to imply that all of the
first eight amendment rights are incorporated "bag and baggage" in the Fourteenth
Amendment, but it would seem unnecessary to try to recapitulate the debate between
Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter, arguing for incorporation only of "fundamental" rights,
and Justice Black, of all of the Bill of Rights. The point may be adequately made by
reference to Duncan itself, and to subsequent cases such as Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970) (holding that due process does not require 12 person jury in state trial for non-
capital case), and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding a non-unanimous
state jury verdict in non-capital case).
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Her Peers," and TM. But that is the point: these are issues judges must
confront. We cannot understand a judge's responsibilities, and we
cannot know what sort of persons we should select as our judges, unless
we understand the passions our judges must confront.
This puts a heavy burden on the Discussion Leader, who must deal
with passions dispassionately. I am sure that I would encounter some
difficulty, were I the Discussion Leader, in presenting Cohens and
Brown, for example. Virginia's argument and Jefferson's
correspondence outrage me. One may no doubt criticize Brown for its
reliance on empirical evidence, but on the merits, how could the Court
not have concluded that the children were being denied equal protection?
The purpose of the course, however, is not to teach the conclusions a
judge should reach when deciding a case, but the tools a judge should
use, while at the same time imparting some sense of the required learning
and skill and self-control if we are to live under the rule of law.
Perhaps at the end the Discussion Leader might sum up as follows.
A judge is responsible to the law, and only to the law, never to "the
people," or "the majority," or a political party or ideology, "liberal" or
"conservative,". "activist" or "passive." Determining the law will
sometimes be difficult beyond the ability of a judge to be persuasive;
conscientious judges and thoughtful citizens will disagree. This is
inevitable, for the tools available to the judges are imprecise. And when
the judge has determined the law, such fierce popular disagreement may
result that sometimes the judge will falter. The most extraordinary
feature of our system of government is that we know that all this is so,
and, yet, we put our faith in our judges' fulfilling their responsibilities.
We accept "the rule of law."
Most of the time, our faith has been justified. But not always. Let
us therefore reflect that we should give the closest possible attention to
how we select our judges. Is the process we have chosen designed to
ensure, to the extent any political process can ensure, that our judges will
justify our faith in them?
III. A Plea to Teachers and the Bar
My plea is in two parts: one, for recognition of the importance of a
course instructing non-lawyers on the nature of a judge's responsibilities;
and, two, that the course as I have outlined it above be criticized and
made stronger than I have made it.
For some years, while I was a judge and afterward, I was a part-time
law teacher. I therefore have some appreciation of the view most
teachers share: that their highest obligations are to scholarship and to
their students. To take time to review, strengthen, and teach the
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idiosyncratic course I have outlined will strike many teachers as time
they cannot afford. I can only hope that the urgency of the need to
reform our process of selecting judges will overcome that concern.
Besides, I suggest, the effort would deepen scholarship and lead to better
teaching, as pro bono representation often makes for better lawyers.
The problems that the outlined course would put to the participants
are difficult. I was never able to master them. The effort to define the
problems accurately, to marshall the most effective materials to illustrate
their dimensions, and to do this so well that persons untrained in the law
will grasp their difficulty and thereby gain a deeper understanding of our
system of government, that would be a worthy task. And it would bring
together scholars who don't usually work together-for example,
teachers of law, literature, history and government. We would all be
enriched.
IV. We Should Select Our Judges on Their Merits, Not by Elections
Merit selection systems differ in detail but not on essentials.'71 A
nonpartisan, or bipartisan, committee, with a membership representative
of the state's citizens, recommends a number of persons found by it to be
qualified to fill a judicial vacancy. The governor nominates one of these
persons to the senate. If confirmed, the nominee serves a relatively brief
term and then stands for a retention (yes/no) election to a full term. In
my view, when we understand a judge's responsibilities, we must
conclude that merit selection is more likely than elections to produce




An elected judge may turn out to have the knowledge of the law and
the analytical skills necessary to do a respectable job of construing a
statute and developing the common law. But that is more the result of
good luck because too often, successful judicial candidates in an elective
system win because of random factors having little to do with
qualifications. Such factors could include having a well-known name,
personal wealth or the ability to raise lots of money to become known,
171. For a discussion of different ways of structuring a meri selection system, see
PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 1.
172. I am unhappily aware of the fact that some judges, including some of my former
colleagues, may interpret this paper as a personal criticism of them. I hope they will not.
In over twenty years on the bench I worked with many judges, and for many of those I
came to have both affection and admiration. It is not my intention to criticize any judge
but to criticize the system of which the judges are apart--a system as unfair to them as it
is to the public.
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regional residence, and so forth. A merit selection nominating
committee charged with evaluating qualifications - rather than
electability - has a much better chance of finding competence than does
the process of partisan election.
For one thing, unlike political parties, the nominating committee is
concerned with legal ability, not the ability of an applicant to get elected.
Legal ability is a quality that can be determined with considerable
confidence. Lawyers know who among their ranks are the most
competent: they have crossed swords, and the best have a track record.
In addition, the nominating committee will have a much bigger pool
from which to select competent persons, for many highly competent
lawyers who would be willing to accept judicial nomination and
appointment will not run for election, as a partisan and a supplicant of
campaign contributions.
The pool, moreover, will not only be bigger but more diverse.
Political parties nominate candidates they think can be elected. That
reasoning often excludes women and members of minority groups. A
nominating committee with women and minority members is likely to
recommend a diverse group of persons to the governor. The resulting
more diverse bench will produce better, more informed decisions, and
will encourage public confidence in the courts.
B. Impartiality
Elections by definition are partisan exercises. Calling elections
"nonpartisan" by removing party labels doesn't sanitize them; the parties
and special interest groups remain free to identify the candidates they
support. Moreover, the lawyers who run for election as judge may see
themselves and may run as partisans, overtly appealing to the same
constituencies as a candidate for legislative or executive office.173
But even judicial candidates who attempt to remain above
partisanship are tainted by the election process, not simply because of
their party label but because of the partisan support they receive. In
particular, judicial candidates receive contributions to their campaigns
from lawyers who may appear before them and from special interests. 74
173. See, e.g., In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 562-63 (Fla. 2001) (stating that
candidate would "always have the heart of a prosecutor" and "defense attorneys would
not be happy"); In re Mullin, 2000 WL 1603819, at *1 (N.Y. Comm. Jud. Conduct, Sept.
25, 2000) (dealing with campaign literature that identified candidate as "The Authentic
Right To Life Judicial Candidate").
174. Big money is involved, and is getting bigger. From 1983 to 1989, the cost of a
race for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court increased 500%, and, from 1987 to 1997,
159%. The largest amounts raised by contenders increased from $407,711 and $115,457
in 1987 to $1,848,142 and $926,019 in 1995. See PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN
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The point is not that a judge elected with such support may nevertheless
in fact be impartial; whatever the fact, the appearance of partiality to the
causes of the judges' contributors is unavoidable.
The damage done to the judicial process by partisan elections
cannot be overstated. "Trial before an 'unbiased judge' is essential to
due process."'
175
[The requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings] preserves
both the appearance of reality of fairness, generating the feeling, so
important to a popular government, that justice has been done, by
ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the
absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with
assurance that the arbiter is not pre-disposed to find against him.'
76
Under merit selection, the nominating committee is able to
recommend persons who have demonstrated by their manner of
practicing law and by their lives in the community that they are not
partisan by temperament but even-handed and fair in all their dealings.
Nomination by the governor and confirmation by the senate occur




As they undermine a judge's impartiality, so elections undermine a
judge's independence, if not in fact then in appearance. There is no
escape. If the judge decides in favor of a former supporter, the suspicion
of favoritism will arise. If the judge decides against, the suspicion that
the judge "leaned over backwards" and anger due to betrayal will arise.
Too often, an election campaign results in commitments, even if only
COURTS, supra note 1, at 2 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASS'N., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS' POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 83
app. 3, tbl. 1 (1998)). In Texas, the parties and lawyers in the twelve cases heard by the
Texas Supreme Court in November 2001 had contributed $1,603,409 to the nine
positions; in the nine cases heard in September 2001, $1,449,329. See Brief of the Amici
Curiae Public Citizen at 9, Repbulican Party v. Kelly, 122 S. Ct. 2528 (2002) (No. 01-
521) (citing TEXANS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, DOLLAR DOCKET (2001)).
175. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194 (1968)).
176. Marshall v. Jerrico Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
177. When the retention election occurs, partisanship and financial expenditures by
special interests for or against retention may occur, but the effect will not be so damaging
as in a pure elective system: first, because a retention election is not a contest between
candidates, and, second, because if a candidate is not retained, the merit selection process
simply starts over. No system of selecting judges is without flaw. The reasonable goal is
not to eliminate, but to minimize flaw.
2002]
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implicitly, to decide a particular sort of case in a particular way. Having
made the commitment, the judge's ability to make a decision that the
losing litigant and the public alike will consider an independent decision
based on the law is inevitably compromised.
Under merit selection, this danger may not be eliminated, for some
politically partisan considerations may be seen as affecting the
nomination and confirmation process. The danger will, however, be
greatly reduced, for with no need to campaign and to raise money for
campaign expenses, the nominee is under much less pressure to act as a
partisan or make statements that may appear to be commitments. The
pressure will be just the other way: to demonstrate to the nominating
committee, and at the confirmation hearing to the senate, the ability and
temperament to be impartial and faithful to the law.
V. Conclusion
We urgently need to stop electing our judges, in fairness to litigants,
to the public, and to the judges themselves, who, to become judges, must
participate in a process that may compromise their ability to do their
job. 178 Nevertheless, efforts to change the judicial selection process in
Pennsylvania have so far failed. 79 I hope this paper will help those who
are working for change to realize it.
178. For some judges' reaction to their situation, see Press Release, Justice at Stake
Campaign, supra note 1. "In Pennsylvania, 59 percent of the state judges support a
generic proposal for merit selection and retention of judges compared to a plurality of
state judges nationally who oppose this idea." Id.
179. For a brief history, see PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 1, at
8-12.
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APPENDIX A
The First Session: The Rule of Law
Clinton v. Jones, 20 U.S. 681 (1997)
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct
The Second Session: Competence: Statutory Construction
Court martial of Billy Budd
The Third Session: Competence (continued): Law and Morality
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)
Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369 (1944)
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)
The Fourth Session: Competence (continued): The Common Law
T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001)
The Fifth Session: Competence (concluded): Constraints on Judicial
Decision Making
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
"The Home of a Stranger"
The Sixth Session: Impartiality
Excerpt from film, "Rambling Rose"
"A Jury of Her Peers"
The Seventh Session: Impartiality (concluded)
The Merchant of Venice (trial scene)
The Eighth Session: Independence
To Kill a Mockingbird (trial scene)
The Ninth Session: Is the Rule of Law Democratic?
United States Constitution
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
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